SALVADOR URBINA-ALVAREZ, AKA Isidro Venegas De Los Angeles, AKA Isidro De Los… v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SALVADOR URBINA-ALVAREZ, AKA
Isidro Venegas De Los Angeles, AKA
Isidro De Los Angeles Venegas,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 16-70631
Agency No. A078-099-986
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2022
Pasadena, California
Before: McKEOWN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and DANIELS,** District Judge.
The petitioner, who is referred to by both parties as “Venegas,” claims that
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in upholding the decision of an
FILED
MAY 27 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable George B. Daniels, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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immigration judge (“IJ”) because the IJ violated Venegas’s due process rights. We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We reject Venegas’s argument that the IJ violated Venegas’s statutory right
to counsel under 8 U.S.C. § 1362, which is the basis of Venegas’s first due process
claim. The IJ “inquire[d] specifically as to whether petitioner wishe[d] to continue
without a lawyer,” Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), by
asking Venegas multiple times, and in two separate proceedings, whether Venegas
wanted to continue without representation. And the IJ “receive[d] a knowing and
voluntary affirmative response,” id., from Venegas, who consistently chose to
continue pro se. Because the IJ did all that was required to obtain Venegas’s
knowing and voluntary waiver of his statutory right to counsel, Venegas did not
suffer any violation of his due process rights. See id.; see also Biwot v. Gonzales,
403 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2005). Contrary to Venegas’s argument, the IJ had
no obligation in this context to engage in a colloquy designed to protect a criminal
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Cf. United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d
1485, 1487–88 (9th Cir. 1987).
Venegas’s second argument, that the IJ erred by failing to advise him of
certain information and rights pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a), is belied by the
record. The IJ advised Venegas of his right to representation, as explained above.
2

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See Id. § 1240.10(a)(1). Venegas was also advised of “the availability of pro bono
legal services,” as he was provided a list of organizations and attorneys which
provide free legal services at the time he was personally served with the Notice to
Appear. Id. § 1240.10(a)(2). Further, the IJ informed Venegas of relevant
evidentiary rights and procedures, id. § 1240.10(a)(4), and indeed, Venegas was
able to submit a wide range of documents and evidence on appeal. Because the IJ
did not violate any of his obligations under § 1240.10(a), Venegas did not suffer
any violation of his due process rights.1
PETITION DENIED.
1 Venegas waived any challenge as to other duties arising under § 1240.10(a)
by failing to distinctly raise such challenges in his opening brief. See, e.g., Ent.
Rsch. Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217
(9th Cir. 1997).
3

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