Md Nasim Uddin Mishu v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MD NASIM UDDIN MISHU,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 16-73053
Agency No. A206-677-795
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 17, 2022**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Md Nasim Uddin Mishu, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to
remand and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying
his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying
the standards governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID
Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We review for
abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand. Movsisian v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on a lack of detail in Mishu’s testimony about his political party and the
harm he experienced, and inconsistencies within his testimony as to the timing of
the attack on the bridge and the fate of his brother. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048
(adverse credibility determination reasonable under “the totality of the
circumstances”). Mishu’s explanations do not compel a contrary conclusion. See
Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence also
supports the agency’s determination that Mishu did not present documentary
evidence that would otherwise establish his eligibility for relief. See Garcia v.
Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (applicant’s documentary evidence was
insufficient to rehabilitate his testimony). Thus, in the absence of credible
testimony, in this case, Mishu’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Mishu’s CAT claim

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because it was based on the same testimony the agency found not credible, and
Mishu does not point to any other evidence in the record that compels the
conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the
consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Bangladesh. See
Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mishu’s motion to remand
where he failed to establish the evidence submitted would likely change the result
in this case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025
(9th Cir. 2008) (individuals seeking remand or reopening “bear a heavy burden of
proving that, if proceedings were reopened, the new evidence would likely change
the result in the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Angov v.
Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Since a motion to remand is so similar
to a motion to reopen, the motion to remand should be drafted in conformity with
regulations pertinent to motions to reopen.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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