Donald Catherine v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.a.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONALD CATHERINE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-16975
D.C. No.
2:19-cv-01487-JAM-DB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, W. FLETCHER, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Donald Catherine sued Wells Fargo Bank in California state court, alleging
that it mishandled the servicing of his home loan. He asserted claims under
California law and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(e). Wells Fargo removed the case to the Eastern District of California based
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 9 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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on diversity and federal-question jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim and denied Catherine’s motion for leave to
amend. Catherine appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
We begin with Catherine’s argument that the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction, which we consider even though it was raised for the first time
on appeal. See Herklotz v. Parkinson, 848 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2017). Catherine
contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because
Wells Fargo maintains a “principal place of business” in California, destroying
complete diversity between the parties. But see Rouse v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB,
747 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a national bank “is a citizen only of
the state in which its main office is located”); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546
U.S. 303, 307 (2006) (noting that the location of a bank’s main office is
determined by its articles of association). Even if that were true, the district court
also had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Catherine’s RESPA
claims arose under federal law, and supplemental jurisdiction extended to the
related state-law claims. See City of Chicago v. International Coll. of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1997). The district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate and
dismiss Catherine’s state-law claims at the same time as it dismissed the RESPA
claims. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009).

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Turning to the merits and reviewing de novo, Okwu v. McKim, 682 F.3d
841, 844 (9th Cir. 2012), we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed
Catherine’s RESPA causes of action for failure to state a claim. Catherine failed to
allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered actual damages as a result of Wells
Fargo’s purported RESPA violations, a required element of a RESPA claim. 12
U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor did
Catherine establish a “pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements
of” RESPA that would entitle him to statutory damages. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(B).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Catherine’s motion
for leave to file an amended complaint because it correctly determined that further
amendment would be futile. See Kroessler v. CVS Health Corp., 977 F.3d 803, 807
(9th Cir. 2020). Catherine’s proposed amended complaint contains conclusory
assertions of damages similar to those in his first complaint. And while the
proposed amended complaint includes additional facts about the harm that
Catherine suffered, it does not plausibly allege that such harm was caused by Wells
Fargo’s failure to respond to Catherine’s written requests for information in
violation of RESPA.
Catherine does not appeal the dismissal of his state-law claims, so we do not
review them. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015).
The motion for leave to file a supplemental brief (Dkt. No. 27) is granted.

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AFFIRMED.

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