Korena R. Clark v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KORENA R. CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-35749
D.C. No. 6:19-cv-00369-MC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 10, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Korena R. Clark appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s finding that she is not entitled to Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 15 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s order
affirming the denial of social security benefits by the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) de novo and reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence or was based on legal error. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154,
1159 (9th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d
625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). We affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weighing of the medical
opinion evidence. The ALJ discounted Dr. Brenizer’s opinion, concluding it was
inconsistent with the findings of her examination. For example, Dr. Brenizer opined
that Clark had moderate to marked limitations in cognitive, adaptive, and social
functioning and would likely have conflicts at work and be absent many days. Yet,
during her examination of Clark, Dr. Brenizer described her as appearing fully
oriented, with normal speech, intact memory, and with intact insight and judgment.
See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
incongruity between a doctor’s opinion and the medical record provides a “specific
and legitimate reason[] for rejecting” the doctor’s opinion (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Clark argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Brenizer’s opinion as
relying too heavily on Clark’s subjective reports. Generally, an ALJ may reject

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medical opinions “premised to a large extent upon the claimant’s own accounts of
his symptoms and limitations . . . where those complaints have been properly
discounted.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted). But the “rule allowing an ALJ to reject opinions based on self-reports does
not apply in the same manner to opinions regarding mental illness.” Id. As discussed
above, however, the ALJ rejected Dr. Brenizer’s opinion in part based on
inconsistencies with Dr. Brenizer’s own objective evaluation.
The ALJ gave only some weight to Dr. Smyth’s opinion. Dr. Smyth
concluded that Clark had poor interpersonal skills, low-average motivation, and that
she was at times sidetracked due to labile decompensation. But the ALJ found that
these opinions were not entirely consistent with the results of Dr. Smyth’s
examination of Clark. Namely, Smyth noted that Clark had intact cognition, intact
memory, and good grooming. She was also capable of recalling two out of three
objects, listing the days of the week in reverse order, and understanding and recalling
short and simple instructions. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041.
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion to give great
weight to Dr. Kessler’s opinion rather than to Dr. Smyth and Dr. Brenizer’s opinions.
“Although the contrary opinion of a non-examining medical expert does not alone
constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a treating or examining
physician’s opinion, it may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with

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other independent evidence in the record.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,
1149 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ found Dr. Kessler’s opinion that Clark would be
limited to conducting simple tasks with only occasional contact with the public to
be consistent with the objective findings of the examining experts. See Ford v. Saul,
950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that in cases of conflict between
medical opinions, the ALJ need only give “specific and legitimate reasons”
supported by the record for rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion).
2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s “specific, clear and
convincing reasons” for discounting Clark’s own testimony on her limitations.
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The ALJ
noted that Clark’s comments regarding the “intensity, persistence and limiting
effects” of her symptoms were not consistent with evidence in the record. For
example, in July 2014, approximately seven months before her SSI application, her
primary care physician described her as appearing alert and cooperative, with a
normal attention span and mood. Her physician recommended that she restart
psychiatric medication and advised her to stop using alcohol and other drugs. And
a few months after her SSI application, Clark noted some improvement in her
depression and a positive reaction to medication. Additionally, the ALJ noted that
Clark made conflicting reports about her alcohol use. See Carmickle v. Comm’r,
SSA, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record

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is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”). The ALJ
also noted that Clark’s symptoms showed some improvement with treatment. “Such
evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a
claim of disability.” Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017).
Moreover, the ALJ appropriately acknowledged some of Clark’s limitations by
restricting her residual functional capacity to “understanding, remembering, and
carrying out simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with no more than occasional
contact with the general public.” Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusions.
AFFIRMED.

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