Davinder Singh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVINDER SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-71638
Agency No. A208-280-589
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 8, 2021**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Davinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions pro se for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the
denial of asylum as a discretionary matter. Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134,
1137 (9th Cir. 2004). We review questions of law de novo. Garcia-Martinez v.
Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018). We review for substantial evidence
the agency’s factual findings. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th
Cir. 2020). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in its discretionary denial of Singh’s
asylum claim, where it properly considered and weighed all relevant factors before
it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); Kalubi, 364 F.3d at 1139 (discussing the factors
relevant to a discretionary asylum determination). Singh’s contention that the
agency erred by denying asylum as a matter of discretion before analyzing his
statutory eligibility fails. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(a) (giving the IJ authority to
“grant or deny asylum in the exercise of discretion”).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that, even if Singh
established past persecution in Punjab, his presumption of a clear probability of
future persecution was rebutted by evidence that he could safely and reasonably
relocate to another part of India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); Singh v. Whitaker,
914 F.3d 654, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing the analysis required to determine
whether the government met its burden to rebut the presumption of a well-founded
fear of persecution by demonstrating that an applicant could safely relocate).

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Thus, Singh’s withholding of removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Singh failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with
the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to India. See Garcia-
Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
petitioner did not establish the necessary “state action” for CAT relief).
Singh’s contentions that the agency ignored evidence or otherwise erred in
its analysis of his claims also fail. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990
(9th Cir. 2010) (agency need not write an exegesis on every contention);
Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner did not
overcome the presumption that the BIA reviewed the record).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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