United States of America v. Anthony E. Taylor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY E. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20-10342
D.C. No. 2:20-cr-50072-DJH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 8, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and MCSHANE,***
District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
*** The Honorable Michael J. McShane, United States District Judge for
the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
FILED
OCT 13 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Anthony Taylor raises two challenges to the sentence administered after the
district court revoked his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We affirm.
Taylor’s first assignment of error is that the district court relied on an incorrect
career-offender designation from his original sentencing. But “[a]n appeal
challenging a probation revocation proceeding is not the proper avenue through
which to attack the validity of the original sentence.” United States v. Castro-
Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Gerace,
997 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993)). Because the district court could not reconsider
Taylor’s career-offender designation at the revocation proceeding, the district court
did not err. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4; see id. App. Note 1.
Taylor’s second assignment of error is that the district court improperly
delegated its judicial authority to a nonjudicial actor when ordering a supervised
release condition about mental health treatment. We review for plain error because
Taylor failed to object to this condition before the district court. United States v.
Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009). The challenged condition states:
You must participate in a mental health assessment and participate in
mental health treatment as determined to be necessary by a medical or
mental health professional and follow any treatment direction by the
treatment provider.
We have held that if a district court “answer[s] the question of whether [a
defendant] would undergo treatment,” then there is no improper “delegation of

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Article III judicial power.” United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir.
2005). Here, because the district court determined that Taylor “must participate in a
mental health assessment and participate in mental health treatment,” the district
court did not improperly delegate its judicial authority. See id.
AFFIRMED.

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