Irma Pedrego De Chiquette v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IRMA PEDREGO DE CHIQUETTE,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 13-70404
Agency No. A012-688-196
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 19, 2021**
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Irma Pedrego de Chiquette, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from
an immigration judge’s decision finding her removable and denying her
application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 23 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 13-70404
§ 1252. We review de novo questions of law, including whether a state statutory
crime qualifies as an aggravated felony, Jauregui-Cardenas v. Barr, 946 F.3d
1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 2020), and due process claims in immigration proceedings,
Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition for
review.
The agency did not err in concluding that Pedrego de Chiquette’s conviction
under Arizona Revised Statutes (“Ariz. Rev. Stats.”) § 13-3405 constitutes an
aggravated felony where the judicially noticeable documents, and specifically the
transcript of change of plea, unambiguously establish that her conviction was for
attempted transportation of marijuana for sale. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), (U);
Altayar v. Barr, 947 F.3d 544, 549 (9th Cir. 2020) (“When, as here, the conviction
is based on a guilty plea, we may examine the . . . transcript of plea colloquy[] and
any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.”
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Arizona’s definition of attempt at
Ariz. Rev. Stats. § 13-1001(A) is coextensive with the federal definition. See
United States v. Taylor, 529 F.3d 1232, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other
grounds as recognized by United States v. Molinar, 881 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.
2017), implied overruling recognized by Ward v. United States, 936 F.3d 914, 918-
19 (9th Cir. 2019). And the agency properly applied the modified categorical
approach. See Rosas-Castaneda v. Holder, 655 F.3d 875, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2011)

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3 13-70404
(applying the modified categorial approach to Ariz. Rev. Stats. § 13-3405(A)(4)
because the “full range of conduct encompassed by the statute does not constitute
an aggravated felony” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)), overruled
on other grounds by Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc); see also Syed v. Barr, 969 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2020) (“A divisible
statute is one that lists elements in the alternative—thereby creating multiple,
distinct crimes within a single statute.”).
Thus, the agency did not err in finding Pedrego de Chiquette removable and
pretermitting her application for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), 1229b(a)(3); Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir.
2020), as amended (noncitizens removable on aggravated felony grounds are
ineligible for cancellation of removal).
Pedrego de Chiquette’s contentions regarding retroactivity fail where she
filed her application for relief in 2012. See Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d
469, 473 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that because petitioner’s application for relief
was filed after May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act applied to his case); Lata v. INS,
204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process
claim).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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