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20-16379•Yvonne Reed v. Cognizant Technology Solutions
20-16379Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJun 1, 2021
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YVONNE REED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY
SOLUTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-16379
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00061-SMB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2021**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Yvonne Reed appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her
Title VII employment discrimination action. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doughtery v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892,
897 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6));
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 1 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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2 20-16379
O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal on the
basis of the applicable statute of limitations). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Reed’s action as time-barred because
Reed filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run and failed
to show extraordinary circumstances beyond her control that justified equitable
tolling. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (setting forth 90-day period in which Title
VII complainant may bring a civil action); Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd.
P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (90-day period operates as a
limitations period; if a litigant does not file suit within 90 days of receipt of the
notice of right to sue, the action is time-barred); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238,
1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that equitable tolling is warranted “when
extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to
file a claim on time”).
AFFIRMED.
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