Barbara E. Brown v. ALEX COLLINS, Sheriff Deputy, individual and official capacity

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BARBARA E. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALEX COLLINS, Sheriff Deputy,
individual and official capacity,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF MOTOR VEHICLES; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 20-55350
D.C. No. 5:18-cv-01418-CJC-E
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2021**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Barbara E. Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Shelley v. Geren,
666 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Brown’s excessive
force claim against defendant Collins because Brown failed to bring this claim
within the applicable statute of limitations or establish any basis for tolling. See
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 1983 claims are governed by
the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, including state
law regarding tolling); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims); Lukovsky v. City & County of San
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (under federal law, which
determines accrual, “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of the injury which is the basis of the action” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1980)
(plaintiff has burden to prove facts that show tolling).
The district court properly dismissed Brown’s remaining claims in the
operative fourth amended complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 because, despite opportunities to amend, Brown failed to provide
“fair notice” of what each “claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006)
(standard of review); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996)
(complaint does not comply with Rule 8 if “one cannot determine from the
complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Brown failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s motions to
disqualify the district judge because Brown failed to establish extrajudicial bias or
prejudice. See United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2012)
(setting forth standard of review and circumstances requiring disqualification).
We reject as unsupported by the record Brown’s contentions that the district
court engaged in improper conduct.
To the extent Brown makes contentions regarding her prior federal actions,
we do not consider such contentions because they are outside the scope of this
appeal.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

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in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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