Salvador Ortiz Lopez v. Town of Apple Valley, a corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SALVADOR ORTIZ LOPEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
IRMA ORTIZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF APPLE VALLEY, a
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-56412
D.C. No. 5:17-cv-02517-JGB-SP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2021**
Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Salvador Ortiz Lopez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 23 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d
1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ortiz Lopez
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged
deprivations were caused by municipal policy, custom or practice, or whether the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct was ratified by an official with final
policymaking authority. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978) (explaining municipal liability under § 1983); Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d
1231, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that in the absence of an expressly
adopted municipal policy, municipal liability under § 1983 can be established by
proving that an official with final policymaking authority ratified a subordinate’s
unconstitutional decision or action and basis for it); see also Capp v. County of San
Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (setting forth the elements of First
Amendment retaliation).
The district court properly declined to consider alleged violations of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines and the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable arrest raised in Ortiz Lopez’s Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment because these claims were not raised in Ortiz
Lopez’s complaint. See Echlin v. PeaceHealth, 887 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir.

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2018) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot add new claims at the summary judgment
stage without seeking leave to amend).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not
consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. See United States
v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to
the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
Ortiz Lopez’s motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 7) is denied.
Appellee’s request to strike Ortiz Lopez’s Opening Brief, set forth in the
Answering Brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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