United States of America v. MEHRAN KHALILI, AKA Mike Khalili

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MEHRAN KHALILI, AKA Mike Khalili,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-50168
D.C. No.
2:14-cr-00521-JAK-4
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 11, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Mehran Khalili appeals his conviction for conspiracy to structure financial
transactions to evade a law that requires banks to report cash deposits in excess of
$10,000 to the federal government. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a), 5324(a)(3); 31
C.F.R. § 1010.311. Because the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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only as necessary to explain our decision.
I
When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to support Khalili’s conviction. See generally
United States v. Espinoza-Valdez, 889 F.3d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We review
de novo whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A
First, substantial evidence suggests that Khalili was aware of—and hoped to
elude—the reporting requirement, including evidence indicating that: he had made
dozens of cash deposits of greater than $10,000 into other accounts that had
triggered the reporting requirement; he had been told by a teller at the Israel
Discount Bank specifically about the reporting requirement; he had told Daryl
Cuizon that he wished to avoid depositing amounts greater than $10,000 so the
bank wouldn’t ask for his identification; and he had helped make hundreds of
individual deposits—sometimes on a daily basis—into the 3136 account that often
came close to, but never exceeded, the $10,000 threshold. Taken together, such
evidence reasonably supports the district court’s finding that Khalili held the
specific purpose to evade the bank’s reporting obligations.

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B
Likewise, substantial evidence reasonably supports the district court’s
finding that Khalili entered into a conspiratorial agreement with Morad Neman to
structure the deposits, including evidence indicating that: Morad Neman controlled
the 3136 account and Khalili made deposits at Neman’s behest; after he was
arrested, Khalili said, he was “not going to go down for those guys,” which the
district court found to be “an apparent reference to Morad and Hersel Neman”; and
Cuizon told Khalili that he would need to confer with Morad Neman if he wished
to split deposits into amounts below the $10,000 threshold—and Khalili indeed
made no deposits in greater amounts. See, e.g., United States v. Garrison, 888
F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Even though there was no direct evidence that
Garrison had entered into an agreement to participate in a drug conspiracy, it is
well-established that a jury may infer the existence of an agreement from
circumstantial evidence, such as the defendant’s conduct.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
II
The district court did not err in allowing the testimony of Daryl Cuizon.
A
The district court did not err, let alone clearly err, in finding that Cuizon’s
testimony was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. See, e.g.,

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United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We review the
district court’s application of the inevitable discovery doctrine for clear error
because, although it is a mixed question of law and fact, it is essentially a factual
inquiry.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the district court’s finding
that the natural course of the investigation would have unearthed Cuizon’s
testimony is well supported in the record. For example, prior to the unlawful
search, investigators had already found significant evidence leading them toward
Cuizon and indicating her role in managing cash for Morad Neman, thus
solidifying her position as a potentially valuable witness. And, when she was
approached by investigators, Cuizon readily cooperated and freely divulged
information against Khalili during the interview. Khalili has not demonstrated
how any changes in the particular circumstances of that interview would have
materially changed Cuizon’s willingness to participate or the information that she
ultimately disclosed.
B
The court did not commit plain error in allowing Cuizon’s testimony despite
the parties’ pretrial stipulation.1 See United States v. Wells, 879 F.3d 900, 925 (9th
1 Khalili’s motion in limine seeking to exclude Cuizon’s testimony was not
sufficient to preserve this issue for appeal because it did not result in any
“thorough examination” or “explicit and definitive ruling by the district court” on
the meaning and effect of the parties’ stipulation—or on the critical question of
whether the stipulation imposed an independent barrier to admissibility that went

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Cir. 2018) (“Admission of evidence to which there was no objection raised below
is reviewed for plain error.”). Although the terms of the stipulation might appear
to bar all testimony from Cuizon related to the 3136 account, the stipulation can
fairly be read to bar only the admission of specific pieces of evidence that were
unlawfully seized or testimony that directly related to such evidence. Because
Cuizon’s testimony did not discuss any illegally seized evidence, the court did not
plainly err in finding that the stipulation imposed no impediment to its admission at
trial.
AFFIRMED.
beyond the scope of the exclusionary rule itself. See United States v. Archdale,
229 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000).

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