United States of America v. JOSE LUIS ARTEAGA-CENTENO, AKA Jose-Luis Arteaga-Centeno, AKA Jose Luis…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE LUIS ARTEAGA-CENTENO, AKA
Jose-Luis Arteaga-Centeno, AKA Jose Luis
Arteaga-Velasquez, AKA Jose Artiaga,
AKA Jose Luis Artiaga-Centeno, AKA Jose
Luis Barrera, AKA Juan Carlos Elvir
Barrera, AKA Carlos Dorre-Rodriguez,
AKA Carlos Dorre-Rodriquez, AKA Jose
Luis Velasquez-Centeno,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-10412
D.C. No.
3:18-cr-00332-CRB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 1, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,** RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Jose Arteaga-Centeno appeals the district court’s order refusing to dismiss his
indictment for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and reviewing de novo, United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810
(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir.
2013), we affirm.
1. Arteaga-Centeno first argues that district court did not have jurisdiction to
reconsider its dismissal of the indictment. We disagree. A district court has inherent
power to reconsider its own order within the 30-day appeal period. United States v.
Foumai, 910 F.2d 617, 620–21 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, the district court dismissed
the indictment on January 8, 2019. That means the government had until February
8 to move for reconsideration. The government appealed on January 11, but then
moved for reconsideration on February 1.
The government was able to move for reconsideration notwithstanding the
pendency of the appeal because of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. That rule
allows “a timely motion . . . for relief that the [district] court lacks authority to grant
because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 37.
Thus, the motion for reconsideration was timely because it was made pursuant to
Rule 37 and within 30 days of the district court’s order dismissing the indictment.
That the government dismissed its appeal instead of waiting for this court to remand,
does not change that result. Because the reconsideration motion was made within

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the relevant 30-day period, the district court had jurisdiction to grant it and
reconsider its dismissal order.
2. Arteaga-Centeno next argues that his removal order was invalid and cannot
form the basis of a conviction for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Specifically,
he argues that the Immigration Court’s jurisdiction never vested because his Notice
to Appear (“NTA”) lacked the address of the immigration court where it was to be
filed, as well as the time and place of his removal hearing, in violation of 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.14(a), 1003.15(b)(6), and 1003.18(b). But this argument is foreclosed by
our precedent.
In United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, we held that “when an NTA is filed,
jurisdiction exists and vests with the immigration court.” No. 19-30006, 2021 WL
345581, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2021). In other words, “the jurisdiction of the
immigration court vests upon the filing of an NTA, even one that does not at that
time inform the alien of the time, date, and location of the hearing.” Id. Here, the
Department of Homeland Security personally served Arteaga his NTA while he was
in custody. Accordingly, the Immigration Court had jurisdiction.
3. Finally, Arteaga-Centeno raises a collateral attack to his removal. To
succeed, he must show that “(1) [he] exhausted any administrative remedies that
may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation
proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived [him] of the

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opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally
unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).
Arteaga-Centeno cannot carry this burden. “An underlying removal order is
fundamentally unfair if an alien’s due process rights were violated by defects in the
underlying deportation proceeding, and if he suffered prejudice as a result of the
defects.” United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, despite
the omission of the date and time of the hearing from Arteaga-Centeno’s NTA, he
still appeared before an immigration judge for his removal hearing and did not
contest his removability. Thus, the defect in the NTA did not impede his ability to
understand, participate in, or contest the removal proceedings.
Moreover, Arteaga’s only argument in support of prejudice was that the
Immigration Court never had jurisdiction to remove him. But as explained above,
that approach is foreclosed by our precedent. Arteaga-Centeno therefore has
suggested no other “plausible ground for relief from deportation,” which is required
to show prejudice. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir.
2004) (simplified).
AFFIRMED.

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