Sharon Neidlinger v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHARON NEIDLINGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-16141

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02423-DB

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Deborah L. Barnes, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 12, 2020
**

San Francisco, California

Before: TASHIMA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BATAILLON,
***

District Judge.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***
The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for
the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
FILED

SEP 8 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-16141
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Sharon Neidlinger’s (hereinafter
“Neidlinger”) appeal of the denial of widow’s benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) issued an
unfavorable ruling against Neidlinger. The Appeals Council likewise denied
Neidlinger’s request for review. Neidlinger then filed her complaint in federal
district court and requested summary judgment be granted in her favor. On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the district court denied Neidlinger’s motion and
granted the Commissioner’s motion.
Neidlinger argues that the ALJ erred when determining that (1) she was not
married to the insured worker for at least nine months before he died; (2) that the
claimant did not meet the nine-month durational requirement as the death was not
accidental; (3) the claimant was not the biological mother of a biological child of the
insured; (4) the claimant was not the unmarried widow of the deceased insured
worker; and (5) the claimant was not under a disability under the Social Security Act
from October 1, 2010, through the date of this decision. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c).
We review the district court’s decision de novo and therefore must
independently determine whether the Commissioner's decision (1) is free of legal
error and (2) is supported by substantial evidence. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601
(9th Cir. 1989). “On judicial review, an ALJ’s factual findings . . . ‘ [are]

3 19-16141
‘conclusive’ if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.
1148, 1153 (2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). As the Supreme Court has
indicated, the substantial evidence threshold “is not high” and “it defers to the
presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” Id. at 1154, 1157; see also
Valentine v. Comm. Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)
(substantial evidence “is a highly deferential standard of review”). Where evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation “more than a mere scintilla”
“It means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In social security
cases, federal courts “are not triers of fact” and a court “may not substitute its
judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Fair, 885 F.2d at 604; Flaten v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
The ALJ determined that the claimant did not meet the durational requirement
for marriage prior to the insured’s death. The ALJ also decided that the insured’s
death was not accidental and rejected plaintiff’s claim that her miscarriage qualified
her as a biological mother of a child. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s findings,
determining that plaintiff did not meet the exceptions to the nine-month marriage
durational requirement. The district court determined that the insured’s death was
not accidental, and Neidlinger was not the biological or adoptive mother of a child

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during the marriage. The district court found that the death was a result of a
voluntary and intentional suicide.
The decision of the district court is affirmed as substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s decision that the claimant is not entitled to widow’s insurance benefits
because (1) she does not meet the durational requirement for marriage, and (2) no
exceptions apply to her claim. In addition, the district court’s conclusions of law are
free of legal error.
AFFIRMED.