United States v. 2020-07-16 | 18-15490 | SHERRIE STEVENS V. ROMEO ARANAS | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHERRIE STEVENS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROMEO ARANAS, M.D.; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-15490

D.C. No.
2:15-cv-01002-JAD-NJK

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 14, 2020
**

Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

Sherrie Stevens appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in favor of prison officials in Stevens’ action alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JUL 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-15490
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stevens’
deliberate indifference claim because Stevens failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical
needs. See id. at 1057-60 (deliberate indifference is a “high legal standard” that
requires a defendant is aware of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s
health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the
course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference). Stevens alleged
that Nevada prison officials were deliberately indifferent to her claim that she
suffered from Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy (“RSD”), and that they failed to
provide medication that she had received at a prior institution. However, the
district court correctly observed that “[a] thorough review of [her] records . . .
indicates that no formal, objective RSD diagnosis was ever made.” Contrary to
Stevens’ argument, prison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment when
they require a medical diagnosis of a condition before beginning treatment. Id. at
1057 (explaining that a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if the
prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and
safety). Stevens’ assertion that prison officials failed to follow the
recommendation of outside specialists, is not supported by the record.
The district court also properly determined there was no genuine dispute of

3 18-15490
material fact involving her claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent
by allegedly failing to obtain her Colorado medical records more quickly. Stevens
has not demonstrated that any failure harmed her. See Wood v. Housewright, 900
F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Stevens’ records from Colorado do not include
an objective diagnosis of RSD. Moreover, Stevens received medical treatment for
her other neurological conditions beginning at intake in Nevada, and defendant Dr.
Aranas testified in a deposition -- without contradiction -- that even if Stevens had
RSD, she would likely be receiving the same combination of drugs that she was
already prescribed.
Because Stevens did not identify any service or benefit that she was
otherwise qualified to receive, but nonetheless excluded from because of her
alleged RSD, her facts did not create a genuine dispute related to the ADA. See
McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).
Defendants’ motion to strike Stevens’ letter (Docket Entry No. 38) is denied
as moot.
Stevens’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Docket Entry No. 40) is
denied without prejudice to Stevens first seeking relief in the district court. See
Fed. R. App. P. 8(a).
AFFIRMED.