United States v. 2020-07-15 | 17-73098 | JASPREET SINGH V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JASPREET SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 17-73098

Agency No. A206-445-840

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 13, 2020
**

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

Jaspreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Singh
claims that he experienced persecution in India for his affiliation with the Shiromani
Akali Dal Amritsar Party. His petition contests the BIA’s affirmance of the

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JUL 15 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2
immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination. We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding. See Shrestha v.
Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). Singh’s documentary and testimonial
evidence provide inconsistent statements about who attacked him for his political
activities, who reported the attack to the police, whether he agreed to join the
opposing Badal Party to avoid being killed when party members attacked him, and
whether police later threatened to falsely charge and imprison him if he did not cease
his political activities. Although one or more of these inconsistencies might
reasonably be considered trivial individually, together they undermine the gravamen
of Singh’s allegations. And when given a chance to explain these discrepancies,
Singh neither offered a substantive justification nor acknowledged their relevance to
his claims of political persecution.
1

To the extent one might still accept Singh’s explanations, the record scarcely
compels their acceptance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (stating “the administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary”); Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th

1
We need not address the parties’ dispute over conflicting letters issued by
Singh’s doctor concerning the extent and visibility of his injuries from being
attacked by Badal Party members. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)
(“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues
the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

3
Cir. 2011) (“To reverse [an adverse credibility] finding we must find that the
evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” (brackets
omitted) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992))). A
reasonable adjudicator could conclude that Singh’s inconsistencies—together with
his insistence that they constitute little more than fear-fueled memory lapses about
minor details—suggest fabrication, exaggeration, or, at the very least, an unreliable
memory. Our inquiry ends there. Absent credible testimony, Singh cannot carry his
burden to establish his entitlement to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT
protection. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii) (outlining credibility criteria for
asylum applicants), 1231(b)(3)(C) (same for withholding of removal); see also
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing lack of credibility
to suffice for denial of CAT protection where underlying allegations are
indistinguishable from those supporting asylum and withholding of removal
applications).
PETITION DENIED.