United States v. 2020-06-10 | 19-35467 | GABRIEL ECKARD V. JEFF STRINGHAM | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GABRIEL ECKARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEFF STRINGHAM; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35467

D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00898-RAJ

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 2, 2020
**

Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Washington state prisoner Gabriel Eckard appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First and Eighth
Amendment claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JUN 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-35467
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Eckard’s Eighth
Amendment claims because Eckard failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his mental health and
safety. See id. at 1057, 1060 (holding deliberate indifference is a “high legal
standard” requiring a defendant be aware of and disregard an excessive risk to an
inmate’s health and safety).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Eckard’s First
Amendment claim because Eckard failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether he suffered an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-
53 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires a prisoner to show that the defendants’
conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Eckard’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Eckard failed to demonstrate “exceptional
circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel. See Cano v. Taylor, 739
F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional
circumstances” requirements for appointment of counsel).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Appellees’ motion to strike exhibits attached to the opening brief is denied.
AFFIRMED.