United States v. 2020-01-28 | 18-56269 | JAIRO SEQUEIRA V. THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIRO SEQUEIRA, A Citizen of the United
States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA, a
foreign County; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-56269

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-04332-DMG-
FFM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 28, 2020
**

Before: FARRIS, D.W. NELSON, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Jairo Sequeira appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
action against the Republic of Nicaragua, the City of Chinandega, and the City of
El Viejo (the “sovereign defendants”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JAN 28 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo subject matter
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Phaneuf v.
Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 304–05 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Sequeira’s action against the sovereign
defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Sequeira failed to meet
his burden of production to establish an exception to the sovereign defendants’
immunity under the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(3),(5); see also Terenkian
v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth burden-
shifting framework of the FSIA when a defendant makes a factual jurisdictional
challenge); In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002) (a
court may only exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign and their agents
or instrumentalities when one of the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA
applies). In doing so, the district court properly took evidence and resolved factual
disputes. See Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Intern.
Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316–17 (2017) (“[W]here jurisdictional questions
turn upon further factual development, the trial judge may take evidence and
resolve relevant factual disputes.”). Sequeira’s contentions that the district court
applied the incorrect standard in determining whether the FSIA immunity

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exceptions applied is unpersuasive, and we reject as unsupported by the record his
contentions that the district court erred in its consideration of the parties’
declarations.
The district court’s order the granting sovereign defendants’ motion to
dismiss did not violate the law of the case doctrine because this court’s dismissal
of Sequeira’s previous action against the sovereign defendants did not decide the
issue of whether subject matter jurisdiction existed. See Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the law
of the case doctrine pertains to reconsideration of “an issue that has already been
decided by the same court or a higher court in the same case” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly considered the sovereign defendants’ motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Apple Iphone Antitrust
Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 319 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may be made at any time.”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sequeira’s motion

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for reconsideration of the denial of his request for jurisdictional discovery because
Sequeira’s motion restated the arguments made in support of his original motion
without establishing any basis for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J,
Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1993)
(setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)); C.D. Cal. Local Rule 7-18(c) (setting forth grounds for
reconsideration under local rules); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.
1993) (setting forth standard of review for compliance with local rules); see also
Packsys, S.A. de C.V. v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 899 F.3d 1081, 1094
(9th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial of discovery request were plaintiff did not
identify “specific facts crucial to an immunity determination” that it wished to
verify (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sequeira’s motion
for sanctions because Sequeira failed to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11. See Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815,
819, 826 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a
failure to comply with the safe harbor provision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)
precludes awarding sanctions); Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir.

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2005) (safe harbor provision is strictly enforced).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal.
See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.