Ciron Bentay Springfield v. G. MARSHALL, Lieutenant; Senior Hearing Officer, individual

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CIRON BENTAY SPRINGFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

G. MARSHALL, Lieutenant; Senior
Hearing Officer, individual,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-56584

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-08079-DDP-AGR

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 8, 2020
**

Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Ciron Bentay Springfield appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a retaliation claim. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182,

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JAN 14 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-56584
1191 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Springfield’s
retaliation claim because Springfield failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative
remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850,
1856, 1858-60 (2016) (explaining that an inmate must exhaust “such
administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit; and describing
limited circumstances in which administrative remedies are unavailable (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006)
(“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . means using all steps that the
agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on
the merits).” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.