United States v. 2020-01-10 | 19-50146 | USA V. THOMAS MERDZINSKI | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

THOMAS HENRY MERDZINSKI, AKA
Tom Merdzinski,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50146

D.C. No. 5:08-cr-00139-SGL-1

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 8, 2020
**

Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Thomas Henry Merdzinski appeals from the district court’s denial of his
motion for early termination of his supervised release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse
of discretion, see United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014), we

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JAN 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-50146
affirm.
Merdzinski contends that the district court improperly relied on the
seriousness of his underlying offense and failed to consider the totality of the
evidence regarding his good conduct while on supervision. However, the record
reflects that the district court identified the proper factors that guide an early
termination decision. Though it discussed the seriousness of the underlying
offense, it did so in the context of assessing the threat to the public posed by early
termination and in assessing the nature and circumstances of the offense and
Merdzinski’s history and characteristics, which are permissible considerations. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Moreover, the court expressly considered Merdzinski’s
arguments and evidence in favor of termination and explained why it did not find
those arguments persuasive. The court did not abuse its broad discretion in
concluding that early termination of supervised release was not in the interest of
justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); Emmett, 749 F.3d at 820.
AFFIRMED.