Bradford T. Hines v. National Continental Insurance Company; Does, 1 - 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADFORD T. HINES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL CONTINENTAL
INSURANCE COMPANY; DOES, 1 - 5,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-55414
D.C. No.
2:17-cv-07772-JVS-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 13, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: BOGGS,*** WARDLAW, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Bradford Hines appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint with
prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We review de
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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novo, Soltysik v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018), and affirm.
Hines is a former inmate who, in separate litigation, obtained a default
judgment against a prison-transportation contractor, Extradition Transport of
America (“ETA”), and its owner Billy Taylor. That default judgment was granted
for Eighth Amendment violations that occurred in 2010, during the 19 days ETA
and Taylor transported Hines between prisons in Texas and Nevada. The default
judgment included compensatory damages against both defendants and punitive
damages against Taylor. In the present action, Hines seeks payment of the prior
judgment from National Continental Insurance Co. (“NCIC”), which was
previously ETA’s insurer. Hines argues that under the Motor Carrier Act and its
implementing regulations, NCIC must pay the judgment that resulted from the
violations of Hines’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Hines’s claim against NCIC is irreconcilable with the law. Recovery against
insurers of motor carriers under 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1), 49 C.F.R.
§ 387.301(a)(1), and Department of Transportation Form MCS-90B is limited to
“any final judgment received against the insured for public liability1 resulting from
negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles.” U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., Form MCS-90B: Endorsement for Motor Carrier Policies of Insurance
1 “Public Liability” is defined in the MCS-90B as “liability for bodily injury,
property damage, and environmental restoration.”

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for Public Liability under Section 18 of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982,
https://tinyurl.com/rwbyxxf. Hines brought his original claim on an Eighth
Amendment theory of liability and proved in securing default judgment that ETA
and Taylor exhibited a minimum of “deliberate indifference” towards him and
“[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This is a standard clearly at odds
with negligence. The award of punitive damages against Taylor was similarly
based on Taylor’s “reckless or callous indifference” to Hines’s Eighth Amendment
rights. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Having won default judgment
on a theory that ETA and Taylor acted with deliberate indifference to known risks
in causing his injuries, and that Taylor additionally acted with reckless or callous
indifference to his constitutional rights, Hines may not now turn around and allege
that the default judgment was granted based on the “negligent operation,
maintenance, or use of motor vehicles.” 49 C.F.R. § 387.301(a)(1).
AFFIRMED.

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