Veronica Flores v. Dignity Health, a California corporation

1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VERONICA FLORES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DIGNITY HEALTH, a California
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-56026
D.C. No.
2:18-cv-2471-JFW-AGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 10, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 13 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Veronica Flores appeals the district court’s dismissal of her petition to
confirm an arbitration award. Because the facts are known to the parties, we do
not repeat them here.
I
The district court did not err in denying Flores’s motion to remand, because
Flores’s action is completely preempted by federal law. See Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), completely preempts Flores’s action to
confirm the arbitration award because her claim depends centrally on rights
conferred by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). See Kobold v. Good
Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1041 (9th Cir. 2016); Burnside v.
Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2007). Regardless of
whether Flores’s claim requires interpretation of the CBA, it is preempted because
her claim seeks to vindicate a right created by the labor agreement itself, see
Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1032–34, 1041; the “only source” of her claim, in this
instance, is the agreement, see Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 921
(9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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II
A
The district court did not err in dismissing Flores’s claim as currently
alleged. Flores personally lacks standing under the LMRA to enforce the
arbitration award because she has failed to allege a “hybrid” claim against both her
employer and her union. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
163–65 (1983).
B
However, the district court abused its discretion in denying Flores’s petition
with prejudice. Granting leave to amend would not be futile because, as Dignity
Health acknowledges, Flores could cure her lack of standing under the LMRA by
adding a claim against her union. See id. Further, Flores’s supposed delay alone is
not sufficient to deny leave to amend. See United States v. United Healthcare Ins.
Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1184 (9th Cir. 2016). The district court made no finding that
Flores’s delay was accompanied by some “additional ground—such as prejudice or
bad faith—that would justify the denial,” and none is apparent in the record. Id.
The parties shall pay their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

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