United States of America v. Raul Mejia

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RAUL MEJIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-50132
D.C. No.
3:17-cr-00809-CAB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 21, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, PAEZ, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Raul Mejia, a federal prisoner, appeals his conviction as a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During an
FILED
OCT 29 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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investigation into a burglary at a storage center, police searched Mejia’s truck and
found a firearm hidden behind the glove compartment. The district court declined
to suppress the firearm and denied Mejia’s motion for a Franks hearing. We
review these rulings de novo. United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th
Cir. 2006) (discussing the standard of review for suppression motions); United
States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the standard
of review for Franks hearing motions), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 113 (2018). The
district court also overruled his objections to what he characterizes as “expert
testimony” on the part of a police officer. This we review under “a clear abuse of
discretion” standard. United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1209 (9th Cir.
2014). Upon our review, we affirm Mejia’s conviction.
1. While Mejia argues on appeal that the search warrant for his truck was
invalid, we find it unnecessary to address this claim. The automobile exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as articulated by Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), precludes most of Mejia’s arguments. This exception
generally permits law enforcement, assuming they have probable cause, to search a
vehicle without a warrant. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018).
Further, Mejia does not dispute that law enforcement had probable cause to search
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his truck, arguing instead that there was not probable cause to search behind the
glove compartment. But this is a meritless claim. At minimum, the officer had
probable cause to believe that the proceeds of the burglary or relevant financial
records might be hidden in the truck, and such items could clearly be hidden
behind a glove compartment.
Additionally, Mejia’s claim that the Government forfeited the automobile
exception is meritless. It “is claims that are deemed waived or forfeited, not
arguments.” United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, we have expressly declined to find forfeiture in this context. United
States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 311–12 (9th Cir. 2016); see also United Sates v.
Guzman–Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
2. Because we hold that the search of the truck was justified by the automobile
exception, it is unnecessary for us to address Mejia’s motion for a Franks hearing.
We do note, however, that even if we were to reach this issue, we would affirm
based on the district court’s reasoning: Mejia has failed to articulate any material
statement or omission that is misleading.
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3. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness’s testimony must be
rationally based on his or her perception, helpful to determining a fact in issue, and
“not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of Rule 702.” To the extent that the officer’s testimony went beyond the bounds of
Rule 701, we find that Mejia has failed to show that he was prejudiced by such
statements.
(A) The officer’s testimony about the condition of the gun was acceptable,
and was based on his own recollection during the search of the truck. That he
referred to lubricant on the gun’s slide did not transform him into an expert
witness.
(B) The officer’s testimony about the normal use of hollow point rounds as
compared to full metal jacket rounds was as an expert. Because it was based,
however lightly, on the officer’s abstract and specialized knowledge, it was beyond
the scope of a lay witness. However, this error did not prejudice Mejia. His crime
was committed when he possessed a firearm while being a felon, it does not matter
whether he was using it for practice or self-defense.
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(C) The officer’s testimony about the about the prevalence of fingerprints on
recently-cleaned firearms, a statement to which Mejia did not object, was as an
expert. Even so, Mejia cannot show prejudice from this statement. The statement
is largely intuitive (i.e., a recently-cleaned firearm is not likely to have
fingerprints), and moreover, the total lack of fingerprints would do little to help
Mejia’s argument at trial that the gun did not belong to him.
Mejia’s conviction is therefore AFFIRMED.
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