United States of America v. Quinton Williams

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
QUINTON WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-10490
D.C. No. 2:03-cr-00046-KJD-RJJ-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 18, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Quinton Williams appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a new 24-month term of supervised release. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Williams contends that the government failed to prove that he violated the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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conditions of his supervised release. The evidence presented at the contested
revocation hearing, including witness testimony and a state judgment of
conviction, was sufficient to support the district court’s finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that Williams violated supervised release by committing a state
crime. See United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (“On a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we ask
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (internal quotations omitted)); United States v.
Carrion, 457 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1972) (conviction can be evidence of
supervised release violation even if it is being appealed).
Williams also contends that his 24-month supervised release term is
substantively unreasonable in light of his impaired mental functions. The district
court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The term of supervised release is substantively reasonable in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors,
particularly the need to protect the public. See id. Moreover, the record reflects
that the district court considered only proper sentencing factors. See United States
v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.

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