United States of America v. Michael Quiroz

1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL QUIROZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10358
18-10037
D.C. No.
4:11-cr-00794-RCC-DTF-3
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 11, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON, IKUTA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Michael Quiroz appeals his convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy,
as well as the district court’s $2.3 million restitution order. Quiroz challenges the
admission of certain loan files as well as the admission of charts summarizing the
government’s evidence. He also argues that his restitution amount should be offset
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
because the banks he victimized received a bailout from the U.S. Treasury. We
affirm.
1. Quiroz first argues that the district court erred in admitting files
containing loan applications that he prepared that allegedly contained materially
false information. Our review is for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1988).
The loan file records were admissible nonhearsay as they were
instrumentalities of the charged crimes, alleged to contain material false
statements. See Fed. R. of Evid. 801(c). In addition, many parts of the files were
nonhearsay because they were statements of a party opponent or statements made
in furtherance of a conspiracy. See Fed. R. of Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) and (E). And, the
files are admissible as records of a regularly conducted activity under Rule 803(6)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, even though the files contained photocopies, see
Fed. R. Evid. 1003, and were made by an entity other than the custodian, see
United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the loan files.
2. The district court also did not abuse its discretion, see United States v.
Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1988), in admitting evidence in summary-
chart form. Although this court has “long held that . . . pedagogical devices should
be used only as a testimonial aid, and should not be admitted into evidence or

-- 2 of 3 --

3
otherwise be used by the jury during deliberations,” United States v. Wood, 943
F.2d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991), the court has never reversed a conviction because
the district court improperly received into evidence summary exhibits like those
here, see United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2012). The jury
was properly instructed, the underlying evidence was admissible, the defendant did
not object to the accuracy of the summary, and any error in admitting the charts
was harmless. See id.
3. Lastly, Quiroz argues that his restitution amount should have been
offset because his victims, several large banks, received bailout funds from the
government in 2008. “We review the district court’s restitution order ‘for an abuse
of discretion, provided it is within the bounds of the statutory framework. Factual
findings supporting an order of restitution are reviewed for clear error.’” United
States v. Eyraud, 809 F.3d 462, 467 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2008)). Here, the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act forecloses the relief Quiroz seeks. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B).
And, in any case, the banks repaid the funds to the Treasury.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --