United States of America v. Pamela Marie McGowan

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAMELA MARIE MCGOWAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-35402
D.C. Nos. 3:17-cv-00406-BR
3:10-cr-00487-BR-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submission Deferred April 19, 2019
Submitted July 10, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and LYNN,** District Judge.
Pamela McGowan appeals the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. McGowan concedes that her claim under Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 31 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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1170 (2017), was not filed within one year of when her conviction became final, as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). She argues, however, that her motion is timely
under § 2255(f)(3) because Dean applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review. We expressly rejected that argument in Garcia v. United States, 923 F.3d
1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2019). We therefore deny McGowan’s Dean claim as time-
barred.
2. McGowan also argues that her prior conviction for armed bank robbery does
not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). That argument fails,
however, because we have held that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence
under § 924(c)’s force clause. See United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782, 784 (9th
Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S.
Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019), which held that § 924(c)’s residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague, does not affect our decision in Watson. See Watson, 881
F.3d at 784 (“We need not address the residual clause because we conclude that the
relevant offense of armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under the force
clause.”). McGowan contends that Watson was wrongly decided, but because a
three-judge panel of this court is generally bound by existing Ninth Circuit
precedent subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, see Miller v. Gammie,
335 F.3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003), we must abide by the decision.
AFFIRMED.

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