Charles T. Crockett v. Venalonzo, S.s.u., Co Ii

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES T. CROCKETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VENALONZO, S.S.U., CO II,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-16614
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00959-JJT-JZB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Charles T. Crockett appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a
contraband investigation violated his constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 30 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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736, 741 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s First
Amendment retaliation claim because Crockett failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendant’s action did not reasonably advance a
legitimate correctional goal. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th
Cir. 2005) (elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s Fourth
Amendment claim arising out of a strip search because Crockett failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the search was unreasonable in its
scope, manner, location, or justification. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979) (factors to be considered when evaluating whether search was unreasonable
under Fourth Amendment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s Fourth
Amendment claim related to Crockett’s fecal sample on the basis of qualified
immunity because defendant’s conduct did not violate clearly established rights.
See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014) (defendants sued under
§ 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated a right that was
clearly established; “a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly
established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

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violating it”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim because Crockett failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any alleged deprivation was
objectively sufficiently serious. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(the complained of act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because Crockett failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the complained of conduct
implicated a liberty interest. See Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1053, 1062-63
(9th Cir. 2013) (temporary contraband watch does not trigger due process
protections).
Crockett’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 11) is
denied.
AFFIRMED.

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