United States of America v. Lajai Jamar Pridgette

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LAJAI JAMAR PRIDGETTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-30274
D.C. No. 1:13-cr-00281-EJL-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Lajai Jamar Pridgette appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 120-month concurrent sentences imposed on remand following his
jury-trial conviction for possession of a counterfeit access device and counterfeit
access device making equipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), (4);
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 29 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 16-30274
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1); and transportation of a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2312. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Pridgette first contends that the district court erred in determining that his
prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal
Code § 245(a)(1) is a categorical crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
§§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and 4B1.2(a). Pridgette’s argument is foreclosed by United
States v. Vasquez-Gonzalez, 901 F.3d 1060, 1065-68 (9th Cir. 2018), which was
decided after briefing in this case was complete. In Vasquez-Gonzalez, this court
held that section 245(a)(1) is a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a), which is materially identical to § 4B1.2(a)(1). See id. at 1068; see also
United States v. Werle, 877 F.3d 879, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that the
language of § 16(a) “largely mirrors” the language of § 4B1.2(a)(1)).
Pridgette also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The
district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
51 (2007). The within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances,
including the circumstances of the offense and Pridgette’s lengthy criminal history.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.

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