United States of America v. Marc Groah

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARC GROAH,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10550
DC No. CR 17-0198 WHA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,*** TASHIMA, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Marc Groah was convicted by a magistrate judge under
36 C.F.R. § 2.13(a)(1) for lighting or maintaining a fire on Rodeo Beach in the
FILED
MAR 25 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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Golden Gate National Recreation Area; the district court affirmed the conviction
on appeal. Groah now appeals to this Court on the grounds that the government
did not adduce sufficient evidence to prove that Rodeo Beach was not designated
for fires on the date of the offense, and that the government had not provided
constitutionally sufficient notice that lighting a fire on Rodeo Beach was
prohibited. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. “We review the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal trial de novo,
asking whether, after ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159, 1162
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 971 n.8 (9th Cir.
2004)). To establish the violation with which Groah was charged, the government
had to prove that (1) Groah lit or maintained a fire; and (2) the fire was in an area
not designated for a fire on federally owned land administered by National Park
Service. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.13(a)(1). While Groah does not dispute that he lit and
maintained a fire on federal land, he contends that the government failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodeo Beach was not an area designated for fires
on January 17, 2017, the date of the offense.
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However, National Park Service Ranger Paul Forward—whom the
magistrate judge found to be “percipient” and “knowledgeable”—gave
uncontradicted testimony that Rodeo Beach was not designated for fires on January
17, 2017. Ranger Forward’s testimony provides the minimal evidence required to
establish the status of Rodeo Beach on the day of the offense. See United States v.
Ali, 266 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] bank employee’s uncontradicted
testimony of a bank’s insured status can sufficiently support the jury’s conclusion
that this element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Ranger Forward’s testimony was further corroborated
by a webpage printout from April 2017 showing that, within the Golden Gate
National Recreation Area, only Muir Beach and Ocean Beach are designated for
fires. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find that fires were not
permitted at Rodeo Beach on the date of the charged offense, and that Groah
therefore violated 36 C.F.R. § 2.13(a)(1). See Arnt, 474 F.3d at 1162.
2. We review de novo adequacy of notice claims and a district court’s
interpretation of a regulation, including whether a regulation provides enough
notice to satisfy due process. See Williams v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1040, 1042 (9th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1992). Groah was charged with
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violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.13(a)(1), which states that lighting or maintaining a fire is
“prohibited” on certain federal land, “except in designated areas . . . .” See 36
C.F.R. § 2.13(a)(1). While the regulation itself does not provide notice of which
areas specifically are designated or undesignated for fires, it does provide notice
that fires are prohibited, except in designated areas. See id. This language gives a
“person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know” that he may not
light a fire unless an area is specifically designated for a fire. See Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Because publication in the Code of Federal
Regulations meets the notice requirements imposed by the Constitution, 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.13(a)(1) provided constitutionally sufficient notice that Groah was prohibited
from lighting or maintaining a fire at Rodeo Beach because Rodeo Beach was not
specifically designated for fires. See Bozarov, 974 F.2d at 1045; United States v.
Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
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