Raquel Lopez-Jiguan v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAQUEL LOPEZ-JIGUAN,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 18-70119
Agency No. A202-125-367
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Raquel Lopez-Jiguan, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo, Cerezo v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 15 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 18-70119
Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference
is owed to the BIA’s determination of the governing statutes and
regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We review
for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Garcia-Milian v. Holder,
755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition for review.
In his opening brief, Lopez-Jiguan does not make any arguments regarding
his claim of abuse by his father or fear of harm on account of imputed wealth. See
Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a
brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that any past harm
suffered by Lopez-Jiguan related to gang recruitment did not rise to the level of
persecution. See Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“Persecution is an extreme concept and has been defined as the infliction of
suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a
way regarded as offensive.”); see also Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020-21
(9th Cir. 2006) (finding harm did not rise to the level of persecution where on one
occasion petitioner was detained for three days, beaten, and interrogated). Further,
the agency did not err in finding that Lopez-Jiguan did not establish membership in
a cognizable social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir.
2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular group, “[t]he applicant

-- 2 of 3 --

3 18-70119
must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
237 (BIA 2014))). Thus, we deny Lopez-Jiguan’s petition as to his asylum and
withholding of removal claims.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Lopez-Jiguan failed to establish it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or
with the consent or acquiescence of the government of Guatemala. See Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --