Tomas Plata Salgado v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TOMAS PLATA SALGADO,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-73970
Agency No. A088-720-144
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Tomas Plata Salgado, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying cancellation of removal. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 15 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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review for abuse of discretion the denial of a continuance. Ahmed v. Holder, 569
F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009).
The agency did not err in determining that Plata Salgado is ineligible for
cancellation of removal because his 2009 expedited removal orders broke
continuous physical presence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A); Juarez-Ramos v.
Gonzales, 485 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2007). Plata Salgado has not shown that the
requirement that the record show evidence that an alien was informed of and
accepted the terms of voluntary departure in order for it to break continuous
physical presence should also apply to expedited removals. Cf. Ibarra-Flores v.
Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2006); Matter of Avilez-Nava, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 799, 805 (BIA 2005) (“before it may be found that a presence-breaking
voluntary departure occurred, the record must contain some evidence that the alien
was informed of and accepted its terms” (citation omitted)).
Plata Salgado’s contention that he was prima facie eligible for cancellation
of removal at the time of his first expedited removal order in June 2009 is
unavailing, where continuous physical presence is required during the 10-year
period immediately preceding the application for relief. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A). His contention that the agency ignored his arguments is not
supported.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance for failure

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to show good cause, where Plata Salgado has not explained the factual basis for his
challenge to the expedited removal orders or what evidence he would have
presented in support of that challenge. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29; Ahmed, 569 F.3d at
1012 (listing factors to consider when reviewing the agency’s denial of a
continuance, including the nature of any evidence excluded). Plata Salgado’s
contention that the BIA applied the incorrect standard in upholding the IJ’s denial
of a continuance is not supported. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975,
980 (9th Cir. 2009) (the agency applies the correct legal standard where it
expressly cites and applies relevant case law).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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