LUZ MARIA RAMIREZ-ALCARAZ, AKA Maria Alcarez-Lopez v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUZ MARIA RAMIREZ-ALCARAZ,
AKA Maria Alcarez-Lopez,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-73212
Agency No. A091-684-734
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 6, 2019**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, IKUTA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Luz Ramirez-Alcaraz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
the BIA’s decision dismissing her appeal from an IJ’s order, denying her
application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
FILED
MAR 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Against Torture (“CAT”). She additionally asserts the BIA abused its discretion in
denying her a continuance while her U-visa application was processed. We deny
the petition.
Because all of Ramirez-Alcaraz’s past persecution occurred in the United
States, her eligibility for withholding of removal depended on her ability to
demonstrate it is “more likely than not” she would be persecuted in Mexico on
account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The IJ denied her
withholding of removal claim after making the dispositive finding that she “could
avoid persecution by relocating to another part of Mexico, and, under all
circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect her to do so.” See id.;
Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 337-38 (9th Cir. 2011).
Ramirez-Alcaraz’s testimony that her ex-husband could locate her anywhere in
Mexico because of his connections to a cartel was speculative and unsupported,
and no other evidence in the record suggests her husband would be able to find her
anywhere in Mexico. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
conclusion that Ramirez-Alcaraz failed to demonstrate she could not reasonably
relocate within Mexico to avoid future persecution, and her claim for withholding
of removal accordingly fails. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); Gonzalez-Medina, 641
F.3d at 338.
2

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Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Ramirez-
Alcaraz failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not the Mexican government
would torture her or acquiesce in her torture.1 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The
absence of past persecution and her ability to relocate within Mexico are also
relevant to this determination. Id. § 1208.16(c)(3); see also Edu v. Holder, 624
F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he existence of past torture ‘is ordinarily the
principal factor on which we rely.’” (quoting Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207,
1218 (9th Cir. 2005))). The BIA concluded that Ramirez-Alcaraz’s allegations that
her ex-husband was a member of a drug cartel and would be able to locate her
anywhere in Mexico were “unsubstantiated and speculative.” She was unsure what
cartel he allegedly worked for and the only evidence she presented of her ex-
husband’s cartel connections was a single hearsay statement from 2014. She
admitted that her ex-husband had no connection with the Mexican government and
that most of her knowledge of cartels came from talking with coworkers or
watching the news.
1Contrary to Ramirez-Alcaraz’s assertions, the BIA understood her primary
fear was that her ex-husband would find and persecute her in Mexico and it fully
addressed that argument on the merits. The BIA did not err by also denying her
claim to the extent it alleged a fear of general crime and violence.
3

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Ramirez-Alcaraz contends the BIA abused its discretion by denying her a
continuance while her U-visa application was processed. In the alternative, she
asserts it erred by not remanding to the IJ to make the determination. We disagree.
To warrant either a continuance or remand to the IJ, Ramirez-Alcaraz was
required to show she was prima facie eligible for a U-Visa. See Matter of Sanchez
Sosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 807, 813 (B.I.A. 2012); Partap v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 2010). In order to make this showing, Ramirez-Alcaraz needed to
provide evidence she “has been, is being, or will be helpful to authorities
investigating or prosecuting” a qualifying crime, usually in the form of a law
enforcement certification signed by a designated law enforcement official.
Sanchez Sosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 814. Because the only evidence Ramirez-Alcaraz
submitted to the BIA was a receipt indicating her application was received, the
BIA was unable to determine whether she was prima facie eligible for a U-Visa.
We therefore conclude the BIA did not abuse its discretion by not remanding to the
IJ or granting her a continuance.2
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
2We disagree that the BIA engaged in factfinding. The BIA is permitted to
consider whether new evidence warrants remand. See Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey,
547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471-
73 (B.I.A. 1992).
4

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