Russell K. Hunt v. People of the State of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUSSELL K. HUNT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 18-16064
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01564-JKS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
James K. Singleton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 19, 2019**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Former California state prisoner Russell K. Hunt appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and, reviewing de novo, see Maciel v. Cate,
731 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 2013), we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 22 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We first reject the government’s argument that Hunt’s unconditional release
from custody deprives this court of jurisdiction over his habeas petition. There is
an irrefutable presumption that collateral consequences flow from a criminal
conviction, and a habeas petitioner’s timely challenge to his criminal conviction
therefore “continues to present a live controversy” even after the petitioner is
unconditionally released from custody. See Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215,
1219 (9th Cir. 2005).
Turning to the merits, Hunt argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that he made a credible threat with intent to place the victim in
fear for her or her family’s safety, as is required for California state convictions for
stalking and stalking with a court order in effect. See Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(a)
and (b). We are not persuaded. The evidence at trial showed that Hunt engaged in
an escalating pattern of behavior over a period of years, contacting his victim in
increasingly intrusive and threatening ways, continuing to do so even after
repeatedly being asked to stop, tracking her down after she moved, and continuing
to contact her after she obtained a temporary restraining order against him.
Especially given Hunt’s history of having restraining orders obtained against him
by two previous victims, and viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to
the prosecution,” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), a rational jury
could have found that, even without a direct or overt threat, Hunt’s pattern of

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behavior amounted to a credible threat made with intent to place the victim in fear
for her or her family’s safety. The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that
there was sufficient evidence to convict Hunt of stalking and stalking with a court
order in effect did not involve an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson.
See Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (“Jackson claims
face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers
of judicial deference.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
We deny Hunt’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability. See 9th
Cir. R. 22-1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.

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