Miguel Carrasco-Palma v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL CARRASCO-PALMA,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-70371
Agency No. A200-627-085
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 19, 2019**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Carrasco-Palma, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying cancellation of removal, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 21 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence
the agency’s continuous physical presence determination, Serrano Gutierrez v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 116 (9th Cir. 2008), and the agency’s factual findings,
Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny in part and
dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Carrasco-
Palma failed to establish ten years of continuous physical presence for cancellation
of removal, where the record includes a signed Form I-826 in Spanish indicating
that he accepted administrative voluntary departure in lieu of removal proceedings
in 2008. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A); Serrano Gutierrez, 521 F.3d at 1117-18
(requiring some evidence that alien was informed of and accepted the terms of the
voluntary departure agreement); Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 974
(9th Cir. 2003) (alien’s acceptance of administrative voluntary departure interrupts
the accrual of continuous physical presence).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Carrasco-
Palma failed to establish that any harm he experienced or fears in Mexico was or
would be on account of a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,
1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by

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criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus
to a protected ground.”); see also Ramirez-Munoz v. Holder, 816 F.3d 1226, 1228-
29 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding “imputed wealthy Americans” returning to Mexico
did not constitute a particular social group); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d
1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding “returning Mexicans from the United
States” did not constitute a particular social group). We lack jurisdiction to
consider Carrasco-Palma’s new social group that he raises for the first time in his
opening brief. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court
lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency). Thus, we deny the
petition as to Carrasco-Palma’s withholding of removal claim.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Carrasco-Palma failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured
by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government of Mexico. See Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (2009).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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