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18-15870•Johnny M. Lawrence v. J. Castro;
18-15870Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJan 24, 2019
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHNNY M. LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J. CASTRO; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-15870
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00091-RCJ-VPC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Johnny M. Lawrence appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force during an arrest.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Sprewell v. Golden State
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s excessive force claim
because the video recording of the incident Lawrence attached to the complaint
contradicts Lawrence’s allegations made in the complaint that defendants used an
unreasonable amount of force during his arrest. See Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth factors for determining
whether excessive force was used in arrest); Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (court need
not accept as true allegations that contradict documents or exhibits attached to the
complaint, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
fact, or unreasonable inferences).
The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s conspiracy, failure-to-
protect, and failure-to-train claims because Lawrence failed to allege facts
sufficient to show a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Flores v. County
of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (to state a failure-to-train
claim, plaintiff must show that the official “was deliberately indifferent to the need
to train subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional
harm or deprivation of rights”); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers
violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1990)
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(deprivation of federal constitutional rights is a necessary element of the alleged
conspiracy); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lawrence’s Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion because Lawrence failed to establish any
basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
reconsideration under Rule 60(b)).
We reject as unsupported by the record Lawrence’s contention that the
district court judge was biased.
AFFIRMED.
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