KAILASH CHANDRA CHAUDHARY, Ph. D. v. Girdhari S. Gupta

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KAILASH CHANDRA CHAUDHARY,
Ph. D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GIRDHARI S. GUPTA,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-16077
D.C. No. 5:18-cv-02292-EJD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Kailash Chandra Chaudhary, Ph.D., appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his action alleging claims relating to the termination of his
parental rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 18-16077
(9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Chaudhary’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the claims are a
“de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined”
with that judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[The] Rooker-Feldman [doctrine] prohibits a federal district court from
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a
state court judgment.”); Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal
under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a
legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the
judgment of that court.”); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir.
2012) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman bars “inextricably intertwined” claim
where federal adjudication “would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the
same issues” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Because we affirm for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, we treat the dismissal of the action as being without prejudice.
See Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004).

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3 18-16077
We treat Chaudhary’s motion to consider additional facts from his state
habeas corpus proceedings (Docket Entry No. 3) as a motion to take judicial notice
of the attached February 6, 2004 order from the Santa Clara Superior Court, and
deny the motion. Chaudhary’s second request for appointment of counsel, set forth
in Docket Entry No. 3, is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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