Ivan Rene Moore v. Michelle Rosenblatt, as an individual

17-55708Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJan 23, 2019

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IVAN RENE MOORE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHELLE ROSENBLATT, as an
individual and in her official capacity as
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-55708
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-08021-ODW-GJS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Ivan Rene Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a conspiracy to deprive him of his
constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Bain v.
Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 891 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s federal claims for damages
against the judicial and clerk defendants on the basis of judicial and quasi-judicial
immunity. See Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002)
(absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to “court clerks and other non-judicial
officers for purely administrative acts”); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d
1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant to the determination of
whether an act is judicial in nature and subject to absolute judicial immunity); see
also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (absolute judicial immunity
applies to judicial acts even when a judge’s conduct “was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . . .”). We reject as unsupported by
the record Moore’s contention that he alleged non-judicial conduct and sought
injunctive relief that would not be covered by judicial immunity.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moore further leave
to amend after concluding that amendment would be futile. See Chappel v. Lab.
Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A district court acts within its
discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile . . . .”).

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We reject as meritless Moore’s contention that the district court erred by
dismissing his claims without allowing early discovery from defendants.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Moore’s requests for oral argument, set forth in his opening and reply briefs,
are denied.
This case remains administratively closed as to appellee Kimberly Martin
Braggs. See Docket Entry Nos. 6, 34. We therefore do not reach Moore’s
contentions regarding dismissal of his claims against Braggs.
AFFIRMED.

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