Hmong I, a fictitious name, on behalf of herself v. Lao People's Democratic Republic;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HMONG I, a fictitious name, on behalf of
herself and as representative of members of
a class of similarly situated claimants,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Movants.
No. 17-16828
D.C. No.
2:15-cv-02349-TLN-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2018**
San Francisco, California
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 14 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Before: BOGGS,*** PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff brought this action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(“ATS”), for atrocities allegedly committed by Defendants in Laos as part of a
campaign to destroy the Hmong people. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s order
dismissing her complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.1 She challenges
the denial of her motion for entry of default judgment and her motion for leave to
amend. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007). We
review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for leave to
amend. Cafasso, v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir.
2011).
The ATS “provides district courts with jurisdiction to hear certain claims,
but does not expressly provide any causes of action.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013). We use a two-step framework to
analyze ATS claims. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).
*** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 We construe the district court’s order filed on August 18, 2017, and the August
18, 2017 Judgment as a dismissal for failure to demonstrate federal jurisdiction
under the ATS.

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“First, we determine ‘whether the [ATS] gives a clear, affirmative indication that it
applies extraterritorially.’” Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136
S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016)). The Supreme Court “already answered that the
‘presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that
nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.’” Id. (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at
124).
“Because the ATS is not extraterritorial, then at the second step, we must
ask whether this case involves a domestic application of the statute, by looking to
the statute’s focus.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As part of
this analysis, we “determine whether there is any domestic conduct relevant to
plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The district court did not err in concluding that the allegations in the original
complaint failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS because
Plaintiff did not allege any domestic conduct in the initial complaint. See Kiobel,
569 U.S. at 124–25; see also Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir.
2014) (noting “[i]f all the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end
of the matter under Kiobel”) (citation omitted). Because Plaintiff does not allege
facts sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction, the district court could not have
granted her default judgment. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514

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(2006) (“[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.”). Therefore, the district court
did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file an
amended complaint because the additional allegations in the proposed amended
complaint are insufficient to establish jurisdiction under the ATS. While the
proposed amended complaint includes allegations of domestic conduct, these
allegations are not relevant to the alleged claims under the ATS.2 See Doe, 906
F.3d at 1125–26.
AFFIRMED
2 We grant Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of U.S. House of Representatives
Bill H.R.4716-Hmong Veterans’ Service Recognition Act and US Senate Bill
S.1179-Hmong Veterans’ Service Recognition Act so far as it pertains to taking
judicial notice of the existence of the bills. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lee v. City of
Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001).

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