Shengwen Zhang v. MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHENGWEN ZHANG,
Petitioner,
v.
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-70604
Agency No. A200-265-987
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 5, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and PRATT,*** District
Judge.
Shengwen Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 24 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
affirming the denial of his application for asylum by an Immigration Judge (IJ).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law and
constitutional claims de novo. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791–92 (9th
Cir. 2005). We review the BIA’s factual findings and determination of eligibility
for asylum for substantial evidence. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th
Cir. 2010); Lin v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007). We deny the
petition for review.
The BIA did not adopt the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Instead, it
concluded that, even assuming Zhang was credible, he had not met his burden of
demonstrating that he had suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of
future persecution based on a protected ground. Therefore, we need not address
whether substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of
asylum because Zhang failed to show he suffered harm rising to the level of
persecution. The beating and detention Zhang suffered, by themselves, are
insufficient to demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution. Additionally,
Zhang did not suffer any negative employment consequences as a result of the
alleged persecution. Finally, the Chinese government did not forbid Zhang from
practicing the religion it imputed to him as a condition of his release from

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detention, rather, it permitted him to continue practicing the religion it believed he
practiced even though he did not. See Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1215–16
(9th Cir. 2018).
Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Zhang
failed to satisfy his burden of proving a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Assuming Zhang’s testimony was credible, he has established the subjective prong
of the well-founded-fear requirement. See Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1029
(9th Cir. 2008). However, he cannot establish the objective reasonableness of that
fear. See id. Presumably, Zhang’s family continues to practice Catholicism in
China, and Zhang has not presented any evidence that his family members have
been harmed for practicing the religion imputed to him. See Sinha v. Holder, 564
F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009). Additionally, although Zhang presented evidence
that the police had initially looked for him after he failed to report to the public
security bureau as required, he did not present any evidence that they were still
looking for him at the time of the hearing. Therefore, Zhang has not shown “‘a
good reason to fear future persecution’ based on ‘credible, direct, and specific
evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear of
persecution.’” Zhao, 540 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897
(9th Cir. 2000)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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