United States of America v. Nathaniel T. Terrell, a.k.a. Nathaniel Tyson Terrell

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL T. TERRELL, a.k.a.
Nathaniel Tyson Terrell,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-30050
D.C. No. 4:07-cr-00013-RRB-3
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 17, 2018*
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Nathaniel T. Terrell appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the consecutive 60-month sentence imposed following the revocation of
his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 18-30050
Terrell contends that the district court procedurally erred by impermissibly
considering the severity of the offense underlying his revocation in imposing the
sentence. We review this contention for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-
Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude there is none.
Contrary to Terrell’s contention, the district court did not base the revocation
sentence solely or primarily on the severity of Terrell’s state manslaughter
conviction. Rather, the district court properly considered the nature of his
violation in connection with its evaluation of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) factors in
fashioning the sentence. See United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th
Cir. 2007).
Terrell also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light
of his efforts at rehabilitation while on supervised release and the lack of prior
violations. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 60-month sentence is substantively reasonable
in light of the section 3583(e) factors and the totality of the circumstances,
including Terrell’s criminal history, the need to protect the public and deter future
criminal activity, and his serious breach of the court’s trust. See Gall, 552 U.S. at
51; Simtob, 485 F.3d at 1063.
AFFIRMED.

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