United States of America v. Alexander Monzoni

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALEXANDER MONZONI,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-50329
D.C. No. 3:16-cr-02674-LAB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 17, 2018**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Alexander Monzoni appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the five-year term of supervised release and three conditions of
supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea convictions for importation of
cocaine and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm as to the supervised
release term but remand as to the challenged supervised release conditions.
Monzoni first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
calculate the Guidelines range for the supervised release term and by insufficiently
explaining its decision to impose a five-year term. We review for plain error, see
United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and
conclude that there is none. Monzoni has not shown a reasonable probability that
he would have received a different sentence had the district court expressly
calculated the applicable Guidelines range. See United States v. Dallman, 533
F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the district court’s reasons for imposing
an above-Guidelines term of supervised release are apparent from the record as a
whole, see United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and
the court did not rely on any proscribed factor in imposing the five-year term. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(c).
Monzoni also contends that the written judgment imposed three conditions
of supervised release that conflict with the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence.
The government concedes, and we agree, that conditions seven and eight conflict
with the oral pronouncement of sentence, which did not include these nonstandard
conditions. See United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2006).
By contrast, condition four’s mandate that Monzoni support his dependents merely

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clarified the district court’s oral pronouncement that Monzoni was required to
support his family, and it was adequately supported by the record. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(d)(1)(A); Napier, 463 F.3d at 1043. Nonetheless, the phrase “and meet
other family responsibilities” in condition four is unconstitutionally vague. See
United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2018). We therefore
remand to the district court with instructions to conform the judgment with the oral
pronouncement of sentence by striking conditions seven and eight, and striking
from condition four the phrase “and meet other family responsibilities.” See
United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED in part with instructions.

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