Diane Marie Lapuzz v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIANE MARIE LAPUZZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-15912
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02136-DJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2018**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges
Diane Marie Lapuzz appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying Lapuzz’s application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act. We review de novo, Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 25 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly provided specific and
legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Freedman’s
opinions. See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676 (specific and legitimate standard for
contradicted medical opinions applies when this court can infer from the record
that a medical opinion is contradicted); see also Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154,
1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing a conflict with treatment notes as a specific and
legitimate reason to reject a treating physician’s opinion); Bray v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ALJ need not accept the
opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief,
conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” (quotation and
citation omitted)). Any error in relying on additional reasons was harmless
because the ALJ properly provided several specific and legitimate reasons for
rejecting Dr. Freedman’s opinions. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115
(9th Cir. 2012) (error is harmless when it is inconsequential to the ultimate
nondisability determination). The ALJ’s opinion reasonably addressed the factors
listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676.
The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons supported by
substantial evidence for discrediting Lapuzz’s testimony, properly linking specific
evidence to the testimony that the ALJ discredited. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,

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806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons
supported by specific findings to discredit claimant testimony); see also Molina,
674 F.3d at 1113 (ALJ properly discredited claimant testimony that was
inconsistent with the medical record); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-
40 (9th Cir. 2008) (effectiveness of medication is a clear and convincing reason to
discredit claimant testimony; ALJ may properly discredit claimant testimony based
on “minimal, conservative treatment”); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th
Cir. 2005) (ALJ may properly include lack of supporting evidence as one reason to
discredit claimant testimony). Any error in relying on additional reasons was
harmless because the ALJ properly provided several clear and convincing reasons
to discredit Lapuzz’s testimony. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533
F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
Lapuzz’s request for oral argument, contained in her opening brief (Dkt. No.
8), is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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