Quan Bin Jin v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
QUAN BIN JIN,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 13-70415
Agency No. A087-957-040
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 11, 2018**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: WARDLAW, BERZON, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Quan Bin Jin petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
decision dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order finding him
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 24 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2
We agree with the BIA that Jin is removable under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
Jin offers several arguments for why he is not, but Minto v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 619,
623–26 (9th Cir. 2017) squarely forecloses those arguments.
We reject Jin’s remaining arguments. First, Jin argues that the IJ and BIA
erred in assigning the burden of proof to him, rather than to the government.
Because he is an imputed applicant for admission, however, Jin indeed bears the
burden of proof. See id. at 624–25 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(2)(A)–(B)).
Second, Jin argues that the single-member BIA decision violated his due
process rights because some issues presented by his case were novel and thus
inappropriate for streamlining. The BIA reviewed Jin’s appeal before Minto was
decided, and so these issues may have been novel at the time. But even assuming
streamlining was inappropriate when it occurred, remand would be futile in light of
Minto, which now forecloses Jin’s arguments. See 854 F.3d at 623–26.
Finally, because our review is limited to the grounds upon which the BIA
relied, we decline to reach the issue of whether Jin is removable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).1 See Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004).
DENIED.
1 Neither the IJ nor the BIA reached this issue. We nonetheless note—as the
BIA did—that the administrative record is “devoid” of any evidence that Jin was
lawfully present in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands on
November 28, 2009 for purposes of Jin’s removability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). See 48 U.S.C. § 1806(a)(1)(A).

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