United States of America v. Coleman Louis Payne

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
COLEMAN LOUIS PAYNE,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-50223
D.C. No.
3:16-cr-02666-JAH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 9, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Coleman Payne appeals the sentence of 80 months in custody and seven
years supervised release following his guilty plea to one count of receipt of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Payne first contends that the district court committed a procedural error by
inferring that all his chat room visits were for purposes of exchanging or discussing
child pornography. Payne admitted he entered the chat room several times a week
to discuss pedophilia fantasies, and the visits extended over several months. The
district court never stated that all of the visits were related to child pornography,
and the record reflects that a proportion of the visits must have been related.
Accordingly, the sentence was not based on the adverse inference that all of
Payne’s chat room visits involved child pornography, and there was no procedural
error.
Payne also challenges the district court’s imposition of three special
conditions of release. Two restrictions - no contact with minors and not loitering
near minors - were clear in their meaning and appropriately related to the statutory
goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public from crimes similar to that of
which Payne had been convicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States v.
Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d
988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing these special conditions of release. The restriction on access to the
internet, however, may reach too broadly in light of the variety of devices and
situations to which it might apply as written. We therefore remand for the district
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court to clarify that the first sentence of the restriction is aimed at devices that have
the capacity to access child pornography.
As to the family responsibilities standard condition, the parties agree that the
condition should not have been included in Payne’s sentence. We therefore also
remand for the district court to strike the family responsibilities standard condition
from Payne’s conditions of supervised release.
AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part.
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