United States of America v. Christopher Jude Martin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JUDE MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 17-50182, 17-50318
D.C. No. 16-CR-138-JGB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District Judge.
Christopher Jude Martin (“Appellant”) broke into an FBI Office and
damaged a wooden FBI seal that hung in the office lobby, a printer located in the
FILED
OCT 05 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

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office’s secure space, and two sets of doors—a double door set that leads from the
public entrance into the office lobby and a single door that leads from the office
lobby into the office’s secure space. Appellant was convicted after a bench trial for
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (“Section 1361”), Injury to Government Property
Exceeding $1,000, and ordered to pay the government restitution pursuant to the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. He now
appeals his conviction and restitution obligation, arguing that the district court
erred by (1) finding the damage to the government property exceeded $1,000; and
(2) including replacement costs and labor costs in the restitution calculation. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. See United States v.
Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm a district court’s judgment
in a bench trial “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Temkin, 797 F.3d 682, 688 (9th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellant argues that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the government relied on
evidence of the replacement value of the damaged property rather than evidence of
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the items’ fair market value. However, by its terms, Section 1361 does not require
the government to use fair market value; rather, the statute is silent as to how to
value the damage. See 18 U.S.C. § 1361. At trial, the government offered
testimony that the aggregate cost of replacing the damaged items reasonably
exceeded $1,000. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
damaged more than $1,000 of government property. See United States v. Seaman,
18 F.3d 649, 650 (9th Cir. 1994).
Restitution Calculation
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s restitution order that is
within the bounds of the statutory framework. United States v. Luis, 765 F.3d
1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). Appellant argues that the district court erred by
including the replacement costs of the damaged items in the restitution calculation,
in addition to including construction and labor costs that the government was
required to expend in installing new items to replace those that Appellant damaged
beyond repair. Because the fair market value of the destroyed doors, FBI seal, and
printer would be difficult to measure, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it used the replacement value to calculate restitution. See United States v.
Kaplan, 839 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2016). Similarly, the district court did not
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abuse its discretion when it included construction fees and labor costs in the
restitution order because the fees and costs are a direct and foreseeable result of
Appellant’s conduct. See United States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc., 265 F.3d 917,
928 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Brock-Davis, 504 F.3d 991, 1000
(9th Cir. 2007).
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Appellant’s conviction and the
district court’s restitution order.
AFFIRMED.
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