Ronald Everett v. M. BLACK, ISU Officer

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD EVERETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M. BLACK, ISU Officer,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-16619
D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01285-AWI-MJS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Ronald Everett appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process
violations in connection with disciplinary proceedings. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 20 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-16619
(9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s
Office for Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal
pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). We may affirm on any
ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534
F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
To the extent that success on Everett’s due process claims stemming from
his 2008 disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
disciplinary conviction that resulted in the loss of good-time credits, Everett’s
claims are barred by Heck, because Everett failed to allege facts demonstrating that
his disciplinary sentence has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87
(barring § 1983 claims which, if successful, “would necessarily imply the
invalidity” of an inmate’s conviction or sentence, unless inmate demonstrates that
the conviction or sentence has been invalidated); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641, 645-48 (1997) (challenge to loss of good-time credits not cognizable
under § 1983). We treat the dismissal of these claims as a dismissal without
prejudice. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Heck dismissals are without prejudice).
To the extent that success on Everett’s due process claims would not
necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction, dismissal was proper
because Everett failed to allege facts sufficient to show a due process violation

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3 17-16619
arising from his placement in administrative segregation. See Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (liberty interest arises only when restraint “imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life”); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986)
(describing due process notice requirements for inmate placement in administrative
segregation), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472.
We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not
presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.

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