OMARI TAHIR, AKA James C. Garrett v. Margaret Delany, individually

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OMARI TAHIR, AKA James C. Garrett,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARGARET DELANY, individually and in
her official capacity as Managing Director of
Midtown Center, LLC.; MIDTOWN
CENTER LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-35718
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02017-JCC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Omari Tahir, AKA James C. Garrett, appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment and dismissal order in his action alleging race discrimination
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”). We have jurisdiction
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 17-35718
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (summary
judgment); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tahir’s Title VI
claim because Tahir failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendants were receiving federal financial assistance at the time the alleged
discrimination occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting race, color, or
national origin discrimination “under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance”); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447
(9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth pleading requirements for a Title VI claim), overruled
on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131
(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Tahir’s state law claims after dismissing his federal
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150,
1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion
for reconsideration of the order denying defendants’ motion to expunge Tahir’s lis
pendens because the remaining claims did not affect title to the real property in this

-- 2 of 3 --

3 17-35718
action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.325; Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for reconsideration).
We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. See 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) (an order remanding a case to the state court from which it was
removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is not reviewable on appeal).
We reject as without merit Tahir’s contentions that the district court applied
the wrong standards on summary judgment, or that the district court gave
defendants legal advice.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --