Muhammad Sikandar Khan v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MUHAMMAD SIKANDAR KHAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-71908
Agency No. A209-166-420
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 10, 2018**
Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Muhammad Sikandar Khan, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions pro se
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his
motion to remand and his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision
denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion
to remand. Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). We
review de novo questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th
Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation
of the governing statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535
(9th Cir. 2004). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings.
Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the
petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Khan’s motion to remand
because Khan failed to raise any contentions that would affect the outcome of his
case. See Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Aliens who seek
to remand or reopen proceedings to pursue relief bear a ‘heavy burden’ of proving
that, if proceedings were reopened, the new evidence would likely change the
result in the case.”) (quoting Matter of Coelho, 20 I & N Dec. 464, 473 (BIA
1992).
As to Khan’s claim of past harm and fear of future persecution in Pakistan,
the agency did not err in finding that he failed to establish membership in a

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cognizable social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016)
(in order to demonstrate membership in a particular group, “[t]he applicant must
‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question.’ ”) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports
the agency’s conclusion that Khan otherwise failed to establish that he was or
would be targeted for harm on account of his religion or political opinion. See INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483(to establish causal nexus to a protected
ground, applicant must provide some evidence of motive, direct or circumstantial).
Thus, Khan’s asylum and withholding of removal claims as to Pakistan fail.
As to Khan’s claim of past harm and fear of future persecution in Brazil,
substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that he failed to
establish he was or would be targeted for harm in Brazil on account of a protected
ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s
“desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random
violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Thus, Khan’s
withholding of removal claim as to Brazil fails.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because

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Khan failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with
the consent or acquiescence of the government of Pakistan or Brazil. See Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (2009).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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