Daniel Murphy Coston v. E. CLARK, Medical Doctor at Corcoran State Prison;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL MURPHY COSTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
E. CLARK, Medical Doctor at Corcoran
State Prison; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-17016
D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 10, 2018**
Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Murphy Coston, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 13 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-17016
Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Coston failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Yu was
deliberately indifferent in his treatment of Coston’s health condition. See id. at
1057-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a
difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to
deliberate indifference).
Contrary to Coston’s contention, the district court did not err by entering
summary judgment sua sponte against Coston because Coston put his deliberate
indifference claim at issue by moving for summary judgment. See Gospel
Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even
when there has been no cross-motion for summary judgment, a district court may
enter summary judgment sua sponte against a moving party if the losing party has
had a full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the matter.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted omitted)).
AFFIRMED.

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