Fred R. Ruiz v. ALBERTSON’S WAREHOUSE, a wholly owned subsidiary of Albertsons, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRED R. RUIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALBERTSON’S WAREHOUSE, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Albertsons, LLC;
ALBERTSON’S, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-16435
D.C. Nos. 2:15-cv-01945-GMS
2:16-cv-02923-GMS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Fred R. Ruiz appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his consolidated actions alleging Title VII and Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) claims related to the termination of his employment as a truck driver.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v.
County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ruiz’s national
origin discrimination and retaliation claims because Ruiz failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination or retaliation. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,
281 F.3d 1054, 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth prima facie elements of
discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ruiz’s hostile
work environment claim because Ruiz failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of his
national origin. See Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003)
(setting forth prima facie requirements for hostile work environment claim under
Title VII).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ruiz’s ADA
claims because the claims are time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-
5(e)(1) (stating that under the ADA, an aggrieved party must file a complaint
within either 180 or 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice has
occurred).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening briefs. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.

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2009).
AFFIRMED.

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