Shoghik Hovhannisyan v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

15-70737Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMar 23, 2018

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHOGHIK HOVHANNISYAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-70737
Agency No. A097-356-760
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 8, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Shoghik Hovhannisyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for review
of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying her motion to reopen
FILED
MAR 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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removal proceedings based on changed country conditions. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
We review for abuse of discretion the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen.
Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006). We reverse the
denial “only if the Board acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.”
Martinez-Hernandez v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hovhannisyan’s
motion. A noncitizen generally may file only one motion to reopen removal
proceedings, and such motion must be filed no later than ninety days after entry of
a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). Hovhannisyan’s motion
to reopen was her second, and it was filed more than five years after the BIA’s
order of removal.
These restrictions may be excused if the petitioner presents material and
previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions that establish prima
facie eligibility for the relief sought. Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th
Cir. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Hovhannisyan has not established that this
exception applies to her case. Although her submitted materials indicate ongoing
skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, they do not suggest that conditions
are “qualitatively different” than in the years preceding her initial hearing. Malty v.
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Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2004). Even accepting Hovhannisyan’s
assertion that conditions in Armenia deteriorated during the relevant period,
Hovhannisyan has not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for any form of relief.
Hovhannisyan has not demonstrated eligibility for asylum because the treatment
that she describes does not rise to the level of persecution. Hovhannisyan has also
not demonstrated eligibility for withholding or for relief under the Convention
Against Torture. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010);
Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 508 (9th Cir. 2013).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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